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INTRODUCTION
The Roman Catholic Church in the United States has been buffeted by
numerous crises in recent years, yet in few places have these crises combined to
such an extent as in the Archdiocese of Boston. From revelations that the
church hierarchy in Boston covered up the actions of sexually abusive priests,'
to the public debate over the politically charged role of the Archdiocese in the
wake of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in favor of same-
sex marriage, 2 to the controversy over whether parish priests should deny
Communion to Catholic presidential nominee John Kerry because of his stance
on abortion,3 the Archdiocese of Boston has acquired an unusually high public
profile--even in a state where the Catholic church has historically carried
significant political influence because of the 44% of Massachusetts citizens
(and 53% of citizens within the geographic boundaries of the Archdiocese) who
4are at least nominally affiliated with the church. Yet in the midst of these very
public crises, a quiet crisis was enveloping the Archdiocese of Boston.
In the span of seven months, from December, 2003, to June, 2004, the
Archdiocese of Boston announced, planned, and executed the most broad-
reaching closure of parishes ever undertaken in the United States.5 This closure
process-called "reconfiguration" by the Archdiocese-was widely opposed
by local parishioners, many of whom faced losing the parish church and
community to which they had belonged for decades. 6 Yet beyond the spiritual
and emotional impact of the parish closure process, the structure of the closure
process created significant problems for both state and local governments. This
was largely because parishes provide a wide variety of social services in their
communities-from schools to food pantries to immigrant assistance
1. See, e.g., Thomas Farragher & Matt Carroll, Bishop Often Sided with Priests in Abuse Cases,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2003, at AI; Robin Washington & Tom Mashberg, Inexcusable; AG: Church
Ignored Priests Molesting Hundreds, BOSTON HERALD, July 24, 2003, at 1.
2. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also, e.g., Ralph Ranalli &
John McElhenny, Catholics Urged To Fight Gay Marriage: Bishop, Bork Try To Mobilize Lawyers,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2004, at B1.
3. See, e.g., Julia Duin, Politics Cloud Kerry's Easter Plans: Boston Archdiocese Threatens To
Deny Communion over Pro-Choice Stance, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004, at Al.
4. BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., GRADUATE CTR. OF THE CITY UNIV. OF N.Y., AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 2001, at 39 (2001), available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/
researchstudies/aris.pdf; Erica Noonan & Kellyanne Mahoney, For Local Parishes, a Reckoning,
BOSTON.COM (Feb. 15, 2004), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/02/15/
forilocal-parishes a_reckoning (on file with author).
5. Michael Paulson, O'Malley Plans Aggressive Cuts: Vows To Decide Church Closings as Early
as June, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2003, at Al.
6. As one parishioner of an East Boston church slated for closure noted, "[1]osing [St. Mary's]
would be like getting evicted from your own home." Noel C. Paul, Church Closures May Alter City's
Rhythm, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 8, 2004, at USA 3. Another parishioner was more stark in
describing the atmosphere at the first Sunday Mass following the announcement that St. Jeremiah
Church in Framingham would be closed: "It's like a wake." Mac Daniel, Amidst Prayers, Vows To
Appeal Parish Closures, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 2004, at B7.
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services-to both parishioners and non-parishioners alike. 7 For instance, one
parish slated for closure operated a day shelter for older homeless people, as
well as an outreach program for homeless and abused teenagers; another ran "a
food pantry that feeds 3,000 people each month, a 188-student school, and the
Little Lambs Baby Program, which provides diapers and baby food to low-
income mothers."8 The reconfiguration procedure pursued by the Archdiocese
of Boston kept government out of the closure process, thereby creating
significant uncertainty and anxiety among both social service recipients (who
feared the loss of those services), and government officials (who feared that
they would have neither the advance notice nor the resources necessary to fill
the gap).
Such a suboptimal outcome need never have arisen. This Note argues that
both the Archdiocese and state government could have better handled the
reconfiguration process in a way that would have resolved the uncertainty
surrounding social services while still respecting the needs of all parties
involved. Moreover, while this Note uses Boston as a case study to determine
what went wrong in the reconfiguration process, the primary aim of this Note is
to identify lessons that can help avoid similar future results in other cities. The
archdioceses of New York, Chicago, and Newark, New Jersey have all
announced that they may be forced to close or consolidate significant numbers
of churches and parishes;9 indeed, in March, 2006, the Archdiocese of New
York announced plans to close thirty-one of its 409 parishes as well as fourteen
parochial schools.' 0 Moreover, a number of smaller dioceses around the
country are also actively considering reconfiguration. 1 As such, the problems
that arose in Boston are almost certain to recur in archdioceses around the
country, unless all parties involved recognize the potential secular problems
that such closings may create and take proactive steps to prevent similar results.
While it may be too late for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to
proactively ensure the protection of its social services in the wake of the
current round of parish closings, this Note argues that the lessons of Boston can
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. Brian MacQuarrie & Kathy McCabe, Closings Cloud Area Services, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31,
2004, at B1.
9. See Andrew Glazer, Merger Plan Worries Catholics; Some Fear End of Old and Familiar
Churches, BERGEN COUNTY REC. (N.J.), May 24, 2004, at Li (reporting on a plan to close forty-eight
parishes in the Archdiocese of Newark); Ana Mendieta, Parishioners Debate Future of W. Side Catholic
Churches, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 18, 2004, at I I (noting that all ten Catholic churches on Chicago's
West Side were being considered for closure and consolidation); Gary Stem, Archdiocese To
Reorganize, J. NEWS (West Nyack, N.Y.), Oct. 25, 2003 (discussing the tentative plans for
reconfiguration of the Archdiocese of New York).
10. Michael Luo, Archdiocese Set for Scaling Back, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at Al.
I1. These dioceses include Buffalo (see Elmer Ploetz, Initial Meeting Held on Reshaping Diocese,
BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 26, 2005, at Dl), Syracuse (see Rahkia Nance, Closing Saddens Parishioners,
PRESS & SUN-BULLETIN (Binghamton, N.Y.), June 22, 2006, at IA), and New Hampshire (see Darry
Madden, Diocese Pooling Parish Resources, BRATTLEBORO REFORMER (Vt.), June 13, 2006).
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certainly inform the growing number of cities and states that will face similar
circumstances in the very near future.
The central question this Note asks is whether the state should have any
legal right to be either involved in or informed about the reorganization
processes of nonprofit organizations (including religious ones), and if so, what
form such involvement should take in order to balance the interests of the state
with the needs (and constitutional rights) of the nonprofits. This Note argues
that the state does have a compelling interest in reserving a legal right of some
level of involvement in the reorganization of nonprofit organizations-in this
instance, the Archdiocese of Boston-in order to mitigate the effects such
reorganizations have on the provision of governmental social services. This
Note then proposes a legislative solution that would empower government to
meet its public obligations while ensuring that the First Amendment rights of
religious nonprofit organizations to manage their own internal affairs are not
infringed. In doing so, this Note not only presents the first scholarly
examination of the 2004 Boston parish closings, but also offers a timely and
practical policy blueprint for addressing the effects of a church-closing trend
that appears likely to spread in the coming years.
Finally, the legislative solution this Note proposes is not limited to
addressing the problem faced by governments in relation to Catholic parish
closings in particular. Major secular nonprofit social service providers that
dominate their respective geographic areas have the potential to create similar
levels of uncertainty and upheaval if they were to close or scale back without
warning. For instance, New York's Harlem Children's Zone runs
comprehensive health and education programs that serve over 8600 at-risk
inner city children in a twenty-four-block region of central Harlem. In New
Jersey, the Community FoodBank delivers twenty-four million pounds of food
annually to 1500 local food pantries throughout the state.' 3 And in urban
Dorchester, Massachusetts, the nonprofit Codman Square Health Center
provides a largely low-income community of 42,000 individuals with an
innovative combination of comprehensive medical care and social, educational,
and community services; its staff records over 120,000 client contacts
annually. 14 The solution proposed herein is therefore of significant general
applicability, as it provides governments with a tool for managing social
12. Harlem Children's Zone, Mission Statement, available at http://www.hcz.org/project/
mission.htmi (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
13. Comm. FoodBank ofNew Jersey, http://www.njfoodbank.org/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
14. Codman Square Health Ctr., http://www.codman.org/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
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service delivery in any instance in which the reconfiguration or closure of a
social service provider (either faith-based or secular) impacts the public in a
significant way.
Part I of this Note outlines the background of the Boston parish
reconfiguration process, providing a chronology of the events of early 2004 and
illustrating the various tensions that arose as the process unfolded. Part II draws
attention to one particularly important consequence of the reconfiguration
process-the significant adverse effect of church closings on both parish-
provided social services and the ability of government to adequately meet its
own social welfare obligations. Part III discusses the various governmental
solutions that were proposed in an attempt to ensure that reorganization was
responsive to both governmental and parishioner needs, and demonstrates why
these solutions were ultimately unsuccessful. Part IV then presents the main
thesis of this Note, arguing that there is an alternative approach that would
meld the legal with the diplomatic in order to allow future reorganizations to be
resolved in a more mutually beneficial manner. This Part proposes the use of a
"procedural statute," which would require nonprofit organizations to engage in
a nonbinding consultation with the state if they took (or proposed to take) steps
that would significantly and adversely affect the ability of the state to fulfill its
social service obligations. Part V discusses several legitimate concerns that
critics could raise regarding the proposed statutory solution, including its
validity, its enforceability, its potential unintended effects, and its practical
effectiveness. This Part then rebuts each of these arguments in turn. The
Conclusion suggests that other states consider enacting similar legislation in
order to avoid similar outcomes, if and when other archdioceses-or other
secular nonprofit social service providers-find it necessary to engage in large-
scale reorganizations.
I. THE PARISH RECONFIGURATION PROCESS
In order to understand the problem that state and local governments faced
following the reconfiguration announcement, it is first important to understand
how the reconfiguration process unfolded-the underlying context, the actors
involved, and the speed with which closure decisions were made.
There was no one factor that triggered the decision of the Archdiocese of
Boston to undertake the massive program of parish closures it announced in
December, 2003. Declining Mass attendance, 15 a lack of new seminarians to
take the place of aging priests,' 6 and an increasing number of parishes with
15. Mass attendance dropped 18% between 2002 and 2004, with about one in six Catholics in the
Archdiocese regularly attending Mass in 2004. See Steve Kurkjian, Archdiocese Cites $14m Loss in
Central Fund for 2002-03, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 3, 2004, at BI; Michael Paulson, 1 in 6 Go to Mass,
Data Show Parish Closings, Attendance Linked, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2004, at B3.
16. Between 1988 and 2004 there was a loss of 341 diocesan priests in the Archdiocese of Boston
Yale Law & Policy Review
spiraling deferred maintenance bills 17 all combined to threaten the number of
viable parishes remaining within the Archdiocese. Indeed, demographics in the
Archdiocese meant that many churches no longer served the communities for
whom they were built. The descendants of those Italian and Irish immigrants
who constructed churches in the inner cities at the turn of the twentieth century
no longer lived in proximity to those churches. Instead, they had moved out to
the suburbs, where many parishes were growing rapidly.' 8 This slow, silent
decline was staunched for many years by the Cardinal's Annual Appeal, a
fundraising program in which the more affluent parishes of the Archdiocese
contribute funds to a central Archdiocesan fund, which is then redistributed to
assist these struggling parishes. While these struggling parishes may have had
fewer parishioners, frequently they maintained disproportionately important
roles in their local communities, supporting programs ranging from Catholic
schools and elderly outreach assistance to soup kitchens and literacy programs.
Yet the revelations about the role of the Archdiocese in protecting
pedophile priests in 2002 turned this slow decline into a rapid one. 19 Not only
did Mass attendance begin to decline, but so too did the local weekly
collections upon which almost all churches depend for their immediate
financial needs-by 13% between 2002 and 2004.20 Donations to the
Cardinal's Appeal fell precipitously as well, from a record $17 million in 1999
and a respectable $15.6 million in 2001 to a low of just $8.8 million in 2002,
21according to the Director of the Annual Appeal for the Archdiocese.
Furthermore, the sexual abuse scandal was creating more than financial
problems for the Archdiocese; it was creating sustained criticism of the ability
of the Archdiocese to manage its own affairs. By early 2002, several high-
profile grassroots organizations had formed among lay Catholics, advocating an
overhaul of the personnel in the Archdiocese and a financial settlement of the
(a decline of over 37%). In 2004, the current median age of priests in the Archdiocese was fifty-nine,
and there were 132 active priests over the age of seventy. Archdiocese of Boston, Frequently Asked
Questions About Reconfiguration, http://www.rcab.org/ParishReconfiguration/FAQ.html (last visited
Dec. 15, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
17. Archbishop O'Malley noted that fifty of the 357 parishes in the Archdiocese were unable to pay
their bills, and that the Archdiocese, which had avoided bankruptcy by borrowing $135 million in 2002,
would face a $104 million bill just to repair its buildings within the City of Boston. See Paulson, supra
note 5.
18. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 16 (discussing the demographic shifts in the
Archdiocese over the past century).
19. See, e.g., Kevin Cullen, Experts Say Law Rejected Advice, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7, 2002, at
Al ; Michael Rezendes, Priest Says Church Sought To Cover Up Suit Against Him, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
31, 2002, at B3.
20. See Kurkjian, supra note 15; Michael Paulson, Refocused Church Seeking Donations, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2002, at Al. See also Michael Paulson, Law Makes Annual Pitch for Funds, Other
Drives Struggle: Priests See Reluctance To Give Because of Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2002, at
B5.
21. See, e.g., Michael Paulson, Archdiocese Sets $10.5m as Its Annual Fund-Raising Goal, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2004, at A13.
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abuse claims being made by the alleged victims.
22
As the head of the Archdiocese, Cardinal Bernard Law admitted to having
acquiesced in reassigning priests who had been accused of child abuse, rather
than reporting those priests to the police. 23 However, Cardinal Law believed
that by agreeing to a comprehensive audit of the priest assignment system-and
by agreeing to implement "zero tolerance" safeguards that would prevent future
such abuses-the lay community would be placated.
24 He was wrong.25
Eventually bowing to the growing revolt within the lay community, Cardinal
Law submitted his resignation to the Vatican on December 13, 2002.26 On July
1, 2003, the Vatican announced that in his place, Pope John Paul II had
appointed Bishop Sean O'Malley, the former bishop of Fall River,
Massachusetts and the then-bishop of West Palm Beach, Florida.27 O'Malley's
experience in Fall River made him an attractive candidate for the Boston
position because of his understanding of* the Massachusetts Catholic
community. 28 But O'Malley brought extremely valuable specialist credentials
as well: the very reason O'Malley had been dispatched to West Palm Beach
only nine months earlier was because of his proven ability to negotiate the
resolution of priest sexual abuse scandals. Such skills were certainly in demand
in Boston, and the Vatican recognized the need to bring O'Malley back to
Massachusetts to triage the rapidly deteriorating situation within the
Archdiocese.
29
Upon his installation as Archbishop on July 30, O'Malley's first priority
was to settle the civil sexual abuse lawsuits of at least 500 alleged victims, who
were suing the Archdiocese for a total of over $100 million.30 In addition to the
22. The main group, Voice of the Faithful, was organized in January, 2002, by twenty-five
parishioners of St. John the Evangelist church in Wellesley. Although initially formed in response to
what these parishioners viewed as the systemic problems within the hierarchy of the Archdiocese of
Boston, the group quickly grew into a significant lay force in the Archdiocese. See, e.g., Thomas
Farragher, Lay Group Votes To Seek Cardinal's Ouster, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2002, at Al; Michael
Paulson, Law Seeks To Curb Organizing by Laity, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 2002, at Al; Michael
Paulson, Push is On To Quell Voice of Faithful, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2002, at Al.
23. See, e.g., Marie Szaniszlo, I Am "Sorry "-Contrite Law Unveils Pedophile Priest Policy,
BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 10, 2002, at 1.
24. See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson & Michael Paulson, A "Grieving" Law Apologizes for
Assignment of Geoghan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2002, at Al.
25. Eric Convey, Church Adopts Abuse Policy, BOSTON HERALD, June 15, 2002, at 1.
26. Bernard Cardinal Law, Cardinal's Statement: "Please Keep Me in Your Prayers", BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2002, at A21.
27. See, e.g., Michael Paulson, O 'Malley Offers Plea, Pledge, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2003, at Al.
In 2006, Archbishop O'Malley was created Cardinal by Pope Benedict XVI. See Benedict XVI, General
Audience (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedictxvi/audiences/2006/documents/
hfben-xvi aud_20060222_en.html.
28. Steve Eder, Past Flock Has Warm Memories of Tenure, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2003, at A25.
29. Kevin Cullen, Selection Seems Driven First by Local Needs, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2003, at
A25.
30. See, e.g., Michael Rezendes & Walter V. Robinson, Lennon Picks Sites for Sale, Eyes Court
Test in Abuse Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2002, at Al. These claims were in addition to the $40
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legal and moral ramifications of the lawsuits, these suits were also threatening
to put the already financially struggling Archdiocese into bankruptcy.31 Vowing
that no money from local parish collections or Catholic Charities would be used
to settle the lawsuits, O'Malley promised that the settlements would be paid for
through a combination of Archdiocesan assets, insurance, and the sale of
32Archdiocesan property (as opposed to parish property). On September 9,
2003, after protracted and sometimes tense negotiations, O'Malley announced a
settlement proposal of $85 million,33 which was accepted by the requisite
number of victims on October 20.3 Because of questions surrounding whether
the Archdiocese's insurance companies would cover a portion of the
settlement, O'Malley announced that he would be selling the grandiose
archbishop's residence and grounds, assessed in 2002 at $13.7 million. 35 For a
few fleeting days, it appeared that Archbishop O'Malley had successfully
navigated the Archdiocese through its most grueling crisis, while
acknowledging the need to rebuild the trust and confidence of parishioners in
the years ahead. Instead, this was the calm before the storm.
On December 16, 2003, O'Malley announced that by June 1, 2004, a
massive number of parishes were going to be either merged or closed in an
attempt to refocus the resources of the Archdiocese-a process that the
Archbishop referred to as reconfiguration. Emphasizing that the need for
reconfiguration arose "quite independent of the sex abuse scandal," O'Malley
portrayed the process as essential in order to do what was best "for the entire
faith community, not just what seems to be best for a single parish., 36 Indeed,
O'Malley carefully timed the announcement of the restructuring proposal to
million that the Archdiocese had already paid out to sexual abuse victims, including a $10 million
settlement to eighty-six victims of former priest John Geoghan. See Walter V. Robinson & Michael
Rezendes, Geoghan Victims Agree to $10m Settlement, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2002, at Al;
Archdiocese of Boston, Financial Disclosure of the Archdiocese of Boston Regarding Sexual Abuse
Settlements and Related Costs (Apr. 19, 2006), http://www.rcab.org/Finance/source_uses.htm
[hereinafter Financial Disclosure].
31. Thomas Farragher & Michael Rezendes, Law Given Authority To Seek Ch. 11: No Final
Decision; Outside Backing for Cardinal Wanes, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2002, at A1.
32. The Archbishop's spokesman, Rev. Christopher Coyne, further noted that the settlement would
be paid in part through the sale of up to fifteen church properties, while also acknowledging that the
Archdiocese's insurance carriers had not (as of then) agreed to contribute funds to the settlement. Boston
Church Settles with Abuse Victims, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Sept. 18, 2003, at 732G2.
33. Kevin Cullen & Stephen Kurkjian, Church in an $85 Million Accord: Tentative Record Pact
with 552 over Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2003, at Al. As of April, 2006, the Archdiocese had
agreed to pay a total of $84.1 million to 541 victims as a part of the global settlement. Financial
Disclosure, supra note 30.
34. Ralph Ranalli, Most Plaintiffs Accept $85 Million Church Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2003,
at Al.
35. Michael Paulson, Humbling Move Marks a New Era, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2003, at Al. The
property was eventually sold to Boston College in April, 2004, for a sum of $107.4 million. See Michael
Paulson, Diocese To Sell Headquarters to BC: Brighton Land Nets $107.4m, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21,
2004, at Al.




come after the announced sale of Archdiocesan property, in order to
demonstrate that the Archdiocese's obligations under the sexual abuse
settlement were being met with preexisting resources (rather than with the
resources that would be saved by closing heavily subsidized parishes). Initial
reaction from the parish priests to this announcement was cautiously optimistic,
as they applauded what appeared to be the refreshing openness and honesty of
the new Archdiocesan administration. 37 However, this silver lining was of little
consolation to the lay community. Only days after having resolved the largest
crisis ever faced by the Archdiocese, Catholics were again faced with the
prospect of another widespread upheaval-this time in the form of an
extremely rapid process that would pit neighboring churches and parishioners
against one another.
Indeed, as details of the process emerged, it became clear that the
involvement of the lay community in the restructuring would be both limited
and adversarial. The initial leveling test was how each parish scored on the
"sacramental index"-a weighted composite of the number of baptisms,
weddings, and funerals in the parish over the past year.38 Parishes with low
scores would be presumed to be targets for closing unless a compelling case
could be made otherwise, and vice versa for parishes with high scores. Armed
with these index scores, the Archdiocese then grouped parishes into "clusters"
of three to eight, and required that the parishes in each cluster designate one of
their number for closure-effectively creating, as one Boston Globe columnist
aptly put it, an ecclesiastical version of the reality TV show Survivor.3 9 While
individual parishes would be permitted to offer reasons to the Archdiocese to
demonstrate why their parish should remain open, the final decision about
closings would be made by the Archbishop, and could be appealed only to the
Vatican, and then only on procedural (rather than substantive) grounds.0 These
decisions were also to be made quickly. On January 12, 2004, the Archbishop
set an eight-week deadline-March 8-for parishes to recommend the
candidate for closure in their cluster.4'
In the span of only six months, the Archdiocese moved quickly through the
reconfiguration process, arguing that a rapid consolidation would be less
painful than a long and drawn-out one.4 2 Indeed, the Archdiocese noted that
37. Paulson, supra note 5.
38. Anne E. Kornblut, Parishes Calculate Their Future: "Sacrament Index" Part of Decision on
Closings, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1998, at BI. Although this index had existed for many years as a tool
for allocating priests, the Archdiocese decided to expand the use of the index to help determine
candidates for parish closure.
39. Bella English, Keeping the Faith, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 2004, at El.
40. Gregory L. Tracy, Parish Appeals Unlikely To Succeed, Says Canon Law Expert, PILOT
(Boston), June 4, 2004, available at http://www.rcab.org/Pilot/2004/psO4O6O4/Parishappeals.html.
41. Michael Paulson, O'Malley Seeks Advice on Closings, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al.
42. Kevin Joy & Stephen Kurkjian, Diocese To Speed Parish Closings, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3,
2004, at Al.
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parishes needed to know whether they should invest in maintenance projects,
that parish schools needed to know (prior to their fall opening dates) whether
their parent parish would still exist, and that engaged couples needed to know
whether the church in which they intended to get married would be open on the
date of the wedding.43 An additional factor driving the accelerated closing
schedule was money-as the Archbishop noted, the Archdiocese was on the
brink of financial collapse, and the sale value of property of the parishes that
were eventually designated for closure was estimated at a total of over $400
million.44
Yet the speed and efficiency with which the Archdiocese proceeded with
the restructuring was a shock to many parishes and parishioners, particularly
those who were at risk of closure.45 Under canon law, parishes are owned by
and operated subject to the approval of the Bishop, which means that the
Archdiocese is free to reorganize itself and its "temporal goods" in any way it
wishes in order to further its religious purpose.46 While the decision of the
Archdiocese to close parishes was unquestionably resented by numerous lay
parishioners because of the cursory nature of the consultation, the prospective
dispersal of cohesive parish communities, and the intention of the Archdiocese
to deconsecrate and then sell numerous churches, there was little dispute that
the Archdiocese was within its legal rights to engage in these changes. On May
25, 2004, the Archbishop announced his decision to close or merge sixty-five
of the 357 parishes in the Archdiocese.47
II. THE THREAT TO SOCIAL SERVICES
While the primary impact of the Archdiocese's decision to reorganize was
upon the Catholic spiritual community, the reconfiguration had a second major
impact upon the general public. This impact was closely tied to the reason
many of the churches that scored poorly on the "sacramental index" had
remained open and operating for many years under the subsidy of the
Archdiocese: their social service outreach ministries. With the prospective loss
of parishes, both state and local governments faced the loss of social services
that they had traditionally relied upon to augment their own social welfare
obligations. This Part illustrates the historical commitment of the Catholic
Church to social justice and outlines the three main categories of social services
43. See id.; Michael Paulson, Closings Spur Church To Warn of Weddings, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
27, 2004, at BI.
44. Stephen Kurkjian, Parish Properties Seen Worth $400m, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 2004, at Al.
45. Noonan & Mahoney, supra note 4.
46. Temporal Goods and Their Administration, 1983 CODE c.634-40.
47. Sean O'Malley, Archbishop of Boston, Remarks on Parish Reconfiguration (May 25, 2004),
available at http://www.rcab.org/ParishReconfiguration/statementO4O525.html. Seventeen more parishes




in which the Church has traditionally engaged-social services that were
suddenly threatened by the Boston reconfiguration.
A. The Catholic Church and Social Justice
The commitment to social justice through action has always been a
centerpiece of Roman Catholic doctrine. Catholic parishes have traditionally
operated as more than mere worship communities; indeed, arguably one of the
most significant splits between the Roman Catholics and Martin Luther's
Protestant reformation was Luther's dissent from the Catholic belief that faith
alone, in the absence of good works, was insufficient to ensure entry into the
48Kingdom of God. This commitment to social service was reaffirmed in 1965
by the Second Vatican Council in the papal encyclical Gaudium et Spes. In this
encyclical, Pope Paul VI reminded Catholics that
[a]ll must consider it their sacred duty to count social obligations among their chief
duties today and observe them as such. For the more closely the world comes
together, the more widely do people's obligations transcend particular groups and
extend to the whole world. This will be realized only if individuals and groups
practise moral and social virtues and foster them in social living.
49
In this spirit, the Catholic Church has historically and voluntarily engaged
in numerous social undertakings that have eased the welfare burden of
government. Indeed, while the state may be obliged by law to provide many
of these social welfare services to all residents who qualify, it has long been
recognized that the state frequently relies upon the provision of services by
nonprofit, charitable, and religious organizations in order to augment its own
limited resources.
The Archdiocese of Boston and its parishes have historically embraced the
Catholic doctrine of social justice wholeheartedly, providing a vast array of
social services in Greater Boston communities ranging from parochial schools
to food pantries. 51 At the Archdiocesan level, social services are provided by
Boston Catholic Charities, a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) church-related corporation
that receives its funding from government agencies, religious sources, and a
variety of foundations.52 Boston Catholic Charities is the largest single private
48. See, e.g., STEVEN OZMENT, THE AGE OF REFORM, 1250-1550: AN INTELLECTUAL AND
RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF LATE MEDIEVAL AND REFORMATION EUROPE 223-44, 287-88 (1980).
49. PAUL VI, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN
WORLD 30 (1965).
50. For example, Catholic schools have frequently been liberal toward non-Catholics in their
admission policies, and many of the major hospitals in the United States today were founded (and often
continue to be run) by the Roman Catholic Church and its subsidiaries.
51. Archdiocese of Boston, Social and Health Care Ministries (Nov. 2, 2004), cached version available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20041102094226/http://www.rcab.org/Finance/ministriesSocialHealth.html
("Programs include community health care and emergency assistance, such as shelters, transitional
housing and food pantries; adoption and foster care; mental-health counseling; substance abuse
treatment and educational and vocational training.").
52. CATHOLIC CHARITIES (ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON), ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 15, available at
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social service provider in the Commonwealth; 53 in the fiscal year ending June
30, 2003, Boston Catholic Charities spent $30,468,923 on social service
programs,54 assisting over 213,000 individuals. 55 While the operations of
Catholic Charities were not directly impacted by the parish closings, these
figures illustrate the extent to which the Catholic Church has assumed a
leadership role in social service provision in the Archdiocese. Moreover,
although impressive in their own right, these figures also illustrate by omission
the critical importance of local parishes in local-level social service provision.
These figures do not include the social services provided solely at the parish
level, nor do these figures entirely reflect the significant amount of volunteer or
parish-subsidized labor that contributes to the social justice mission of the
Archdiocese at the local level. Catholic parishes have always played a
significant role in their communities, ministering to the poor, hungry,
unemployed, and dispossessed, Catholic and non-Catholic alike. Indeed, it is in
local service delivery that parish churches have historically played such an
integral role, given that it is at the "street level" where the success of social
service provision is almost always determined 6
The decision of the Archdiocese to close numerous parishes therefore
struck a significant blow not only to worship communities, but also to the
provision of local social services. It is worth noting that the Archdiocese
claimed that it would consider social service provision when making its closure
decisions, asking clusters to make a "careful review of all [such] activities
accomplished in the cluster." 57 Furthermore, Archbishop O'Malley stated prior
to the initiation of the closure process that he wanted to avoid placing the sole
burden of any parish closings on the poor or the immigrant communities in the
Archdiocese.5 8 Yet while the Archdiocese permitted (limited) input from
parishes in reaching its decisions about closings, 59 the Archdiocese did not
http://www.ccab.org/2005_annual-report.pdf.
53. Jim O'Sullivan, New Catholic Charities Head Named, DORCHESTER REP. (Mass.), Oct. 2, 2003,
available at http://www.dotnews.com/hehir.html.
54. CATHOLIC CHARITIES (ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON), ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 7 (on file with
author). Note that this figure is for social services alone, and does not include additional administrative
costs. These social service programs include emergency food and clothing assistance, immigration
counseling and information, parental training classes, adoption services, AIDS care and education,
substance abuse treatment, day care services, home health visitation, and GED preparation. Id. at 8.
55. Letter from Dr. Joseph Doolin, President, Catholic Charities (Archdiocese of Boston), to
Friends of Catholic Charities (2003) (on file with author).
56. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1980).
57. These activities included the "presence of an ethnic apostolate, number and population of parish
schools, outreach to the hungry and homeless, programs for the elderly and homebound, nursing home
coverage, youth groups, number of children in religious education, adult education programs, RCIA
[Rite of Christian Initiation for Adults] meetings hosted by parishes, and a number of other activities
sponsored by parishes." Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 16.
58. Michael Paulson, Many Parishes Seem Closure Candidates, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2003, at
Al.
59. See, e.g., Paulson, supra note 41.
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solicit input from those outside the Catholic community regarding how the
parish closings would affect the wider public communities in which they were
situated. Furthermore, attempts by state and local government to convince the
Archdiocese to consult more widely met with swift rejection, as the
Archdiocese declined to engage in any systematic consultation with state or
local governments regarding the impact that the closures would have on non-
Catholics. 60 Indeed, despite the pleas of numerous governmental leaders to
delay the closing process to mitigate the effect on broader neighborhood
stability, Archbishop O'Malley declined, noting simply that he "consider[ed]
these moves necessary to save the church and strengthen the parishes."" While
the City of Boston eventually resorted to convening an ad hoc task force to
independently assess the extent and necessity of the social services offered at
each of the parishes designated for closure,62 smaller communities were often
left to their own devices in seeking information.
63
B. Types of Social Services Provided Through the Catholic Church
In order to fully understand both the government's attempts to mitigate the
consequences of the reconfiguration and the alternative solution that this Note
proposes, it is essential to understand the impact of the reconfiguration process
upon the three general types of social services that parishes traditionally
provide--"bricks and mortar," "direct service," and "community stability."
Unfortunately, the structure of the reconfiguration process not only eliminated
these types of social services from areas in which they were desperately
needed, but also severely hampered the ability of government to ensure the
continuity of these services through alternative means.
1. Bricks and Mortar
This category consists mostly of schools, because education relies heavily
on fixed physical resources in terms of buildings and physical plant. The
Archdiocese of Boston operates an extensive and comprehensive educational
system, with 168 elementary and high schools educating over 53,000 children
in 2003-04. 64 In Boston alone in 2004, the Archdiocese ran thirty-eight schools,
60. See Stephen Kurkjian, Archdiocese Rebuffs Pleas on Closings, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2004,
at Al; see also Editorial, Sacrificing Churches, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2004, at A12; infra notes 96-
98.
61. Kurkjian, supra note 60.
62. See Kellyanne Mahoney, As Church Doors Shut, City Opens a Window: Panel Seeks Homes for
Human Services, BOSTON GLOBE CITY WKLY., June 20, 2004, at 8.
63. See infra notes 101-103 for examples of the failure of the Archdiocese to communicate with
local governments in a timely manner regarding the potential impact of closure decisions.
64. Archdiocese of Boston Catholic Sch. Office, Schools Directory (Feb. 5, 2004),
http://web.archive.org/web/20040205170858/http://abcso.org/schooldirectory.htm. By 2005-06, however,
the Archdiocese had closed fourteen schools, and enrollments had dropped by over four thousand
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educating nearly 11,000 of the 82,000 school-aged children in the city. 65 Most
Catholic schools are directly associated with a specific parish, from which the
majority of students are usually drawn and which provides a certain amount of
local funding. Because of subsidies from the Archdiocese, tuition is often
significantly less than at private schools, averaging $2570 for elementary
school and $6544 for secondary school in 2002-03.66 Although the
Archdiocesan schools teach a Catholic curriculum and are maintained by
subsidized tuition, most are open to non-Catholic students, and in many urban
areas Catholic schools comprise a significant minority of the overall number of
classroom seats in the school district. It is also important to note that although
parents may decide to send their children to Catholic schools, Massachusetts
law still provides that every child in the Commonwealth is entitled to a place in
a Massachusetts public school.67 Accordingly, the closure of a Catholic or other
private school has the real potential to increase the burden upon the local public
school, through a rapid influx in the number of former Catholic school pupils
who must be accommodated in the public system.
As the reconfiguration itself unfolded, this very concern was paramount
among state and local education officials, given that there was almost no
information forthcoming from the Archdiocese regarding how parishes with
parochial schools would be treated during the reconfiguration. 68 Eventually, it
was revealed that of the eighty-two parishes slated for closure, three would be
closing their schools, two schools would merge, and another six schools would
close elsewhere in the Archdiocese (a move unrelated to the parish
reconfiguration). 69 However, although the number of schools actually closed
was relatively small, the initial March 2004 list of potential closure candidates
included seventeen parishes with schools. 70 This large list created significant
uncertainty within numerous local communities, which were legitimately
concerned that the lack of advance communication-combined with the late-
May timing of the closure announcement-would provide neither parents nor
local public school boards with enough time to plan adequately for the arrival
of displaced pupils. 71 By announcing a decision at the end of May, the
students. See Archdiocese of Boston Catholic Sch. Office, Schools Directory, http://abcso.org/
schooldirectory.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2006).
65. Michael Paulson, Many Parish Schools Seen Surviving, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2004, at Al.
66. Michele Kurtz & Anand Vaishnav, Catholic Schools Struggle in the City, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
9, 2003, at Al.
67. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 1 (2004) (maintenance of public schools).
68. See, e.g., Editorial, Church-City Teamwork, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2004, at Al 8 (noting that
Archdiocesan officials refused to participate in a public hearing regarding the impact of the parish
closures on public education).
69. Suzanne Sataline, Parishes React to School Closings, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 2004, at B4.
70. Paulson, supra note 65.
71. See Joy & Kurkjian, supra note 42; John McElhenny & Kellyanne Mahoney, Parish Closings
Spur Fear of Influx to City's Schools, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2004, at Al.
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Archdiocese almost guaranteed that parents would miss many of the deadlines
for arranging alternative places at other private schools.72 Furthermore, with
most local education budgets having been set several months earlier by city
councils or at town meetings, and with the fiscal year ending on June 30, there
was little time for many communities to arrange for a reallocation of resources
in order to address any enrollment increase that might have arisen as a result of
school consolidations or closures.73 While some communities may have been
able to absorb the new students without difficulties, there existed the real
possibility that a sudden influx of students would create the need for more
classrooms, teachers, supplies, buses, and myriad other fiscal expenditures.
2. Direct Service Provision
This category covers the vast range of services that parishes provide to both
their own parishioners and to their broader local communities. Across the
Archdiocese, these services include health ministries, elderly visitation and
"meals on wheels", substance abuse rehabilitation programs, food pantries,
soup kitchens, immigration assistance services, teaching English as a Second
Language, youth sports leagues, and low-income child care.74 Moreover, many
of these services have been designed specifically to meet the unique needs and
demographics of the parish and community, and as such are highly
geographically dependent. It is somewhat axiomatic that that a Vietnamese
youth program run out of a parish in a Vietnamese immigrant community in
inner city Dorchester would be of little value if the program were retained yet
72. Although the Archdiocese promised that any displaced pupil would be assured a place at
another parochial school, there are obviously significant geographic limitations regarding the extent to
which many families would find this option feasible. See Margery Eagan, Children Get Lost in the
Shuffle, BOSTON HERALD, May 27, 2004, at 8.
73. As Dracut School Superintendent Elaine Espindle told the Boston Globe, "there are 464
students from Dracut attending Catholic school in Lowell," a city where two schools were associated
with parishes recommended for closure. Espindle's concem was "that some of these students will enroll
in local schools. This would have a big impact on the district's spending in 2005, since the enrollment
numbers used to determine the budget do not include any increases from parochial school closings."
Alexander Reid, Crunching the Numbers: School Budget Planning Hampered by Uncertainties, BOSTON
GLOBE NORTHWEST WKLY., Mar. 18, 2004, at 1.
74. To document these services parish-by-parish is well beyond the capacity of this Note. However,
an illustrative sense of the scope of these parish-level programs can be found by quickly perusing local
parish websites. See, e.g., The Paulist Center Boston, Paulist Center Groups,
http://www.paulist.org/boston/groups/index.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2006) (food pantry, soup kitchen,
Interfaith Partnership against Domestic Violence); St. Blaise Catholic Church (Bellingham), Special
Sections, http://www.saintblaise.org/SpecialSections/tabid/61/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2006)
(community harvest, food pantry); St. Joseph Parish (Salem), Ministries (Aug. 9, 2002), cached version
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20020809140435/http://www.stjoseph-church.com/ministries.htm
(Hispanic community group, food pantry, youth programs); St. William's Parish (Dorchester),
Ministries/Opportunities, http://www.technobridge.com/stwil/parish.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2006)
(St. Vincent dePaul Society (assistance to poor families), English as a Second Language, Legion of
Mary (visitation of the sick), soup kitchen, visitation to homeless mothers and children, youth sports
league).
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moved to a parish in suburban Wellesley. However, although the Archdiocese
promised to consider the implications of social service provision during the
reconfiguration process, 75 the lack of transparency in the reconfiguration
process made it impossible to determine whether these implications were
weighted appropriately (or even at all). Indeed, an anecdotal review of the
parishes slated for closure revealed that many of these parishes offered a robust
range of social service programs, all of which were therefore in danger of either
being eliminated or being moved out of the local community.7 6 Notably, the
proposed closings also disproportionately affected churches in urban areas-
precisely the areas in which parish-based social service provision is often the
most crucial."
This failure of the reconfiguration process to adequately explain or redress
the consequences of reconfiguration on parish-level social service provision is
significant for two main reasons. First, the parishes in which many of these
services are most needed are often those parishes that have the least money.
There is obviously much less need for many of these social services in the
wealthier, self-sustaining parishes-parishes which were generally spared
during reconfiguration. 78 Second, because the direct services are usually
provided by the parish without significant regard for the religious affiliation of
the recipients, many of those who had the potential to be most affected by the
elimination of parish-provided direct services were not Catholic. These
individuals were thus not even provided with any meaningful opportunity to
voice their concerns about the impact the reconfiguration process would have
on their lives.
3. Community Stability
The third category, community stability, is the least visible of the social
services provided by parishes, but is no less vital. Institutions-be they
75. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 16.
76. See, e.g., Kathy McCabe, United by Hope, Heritage, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 2004, at North I
(quoting parish officials of a church slated for closure who observed that many of those in the local
community "turn to the churches for guidance on nonspiritual matters, such as housing, health care, and
work"); State Rep. James Murphy, Letter to the Editor, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2004, at South 6
(noting that a church slated for closure in his constituency "serves as the base of operation for numerous
outreach activities, such as girls' color guard, CYO sports, adult education and faith formation, parish
health ministry, and the St. Vincent DePaul Society").
77. Twenty-seven percent of urban parishes were closed, as opposed to only 18% of suburban
parishes and 10% of small town/rural parishes. Boston.com, Closings at a Glance,
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/parishes/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
78. For example, Gate of Heaven in Dorchester-the home parish of many powerful Boston
political families-was initially recommended for closure by the other churches in its cluster, on the
grounds that the money being spent on its upkeep alone could support the remainder of the churches in
the cluster. See Stephen Kurkjian & Kellyanne Mahoney, Two South Boston Churches Targeted for
Closure, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2004, at Al. However, the Archdiocese ultimately declined to act
upon this particular recommendation.
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churches, schools, general stores, or others-are extremely important to the
stability of communities because they provide disparate components of a
community with a sense of common connection. As the Boston Globe noted,
"the loss of a respected central institution such as a church or community center
can quickly lead to disinvestment and neighborhood destabilization., 79 For
example, former Boston Mayor Ray Flynn observed that the churches of South
Boston had played a crucial role in quietly addressing that area's youth drug
problem, and voiced concern that the reconfiguration process would not fully
account for these kinds of contributions. "The government is getting out of the
business of helping people," said Flynn. "People need somewhere to go for
family stability." s Parishes and other institutional actors have often spent years
working to acquire the trust of their communities, through the slow process of
building the intangible personal networks that are so essential for successful
local-level social service provision. 8 Yet the sudden elimination of parishes
(and the influence that those parishes hold in their local communities) creates
significant problems for governmental entities, which were given only a few
months to attempt to replace social services whose prior success may have
relied heavily upon mutual trust that took years to accumulate.
For example, during the 1990s, the Boston Police Department engaged in a
unique community collaboration, forming partnerships with local church
leaders in order to reform the community perception of the police force. Studies
showed that between 1990 and 1999, homicide rates in Boston fell by 80%,
while complaints against police declined by 60%-declines that these studies
attribute partially to the effectiveness of these community partnerships. 82 Other
services such as immigration services rely heavily upon institutional trust
networks as well, because immigrants-often unfamiliar with local laws,
language or customs-must place significant trust in those to whom they turn
for help. Despite the fact that Boston had sixty-seven parishes with ethnic
communities large enough to support a separate ethnic-language Mass 83-i.e.,
parishes in which immigration assistance and other similar social services
might be in high demand-eighteen of these parishes were designated for
closure.84 Although the impact of reconfiguration on community stability may
79. Editorial, When Churches Close, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2003, at A10.
80. Kellyanne Mahoney, Survival of the Chosen Churches: Quietly, Parish Members Meet To Face
Closing Choices, BOSTON GLOBE CITY WKLY., Feb. 8, 2004, at I.
81. For an excellent discussion of the role that Boston's Catholic churches have historically played
in maintaining neighborhood and community stability, see GERALD GAMM, URBAN EXODUS: WHY THE
JEWS LEFT BOSTON AND THE CATHOLICS STAYED (2001).
82. See. e.g., Jenny Berrien & Christopher Winship, Lessons Learned from Boston's Police-
Community Collaboration, FED. PROBATION REV., Dec. 1999, at 25; Christopher Winship & Jenny
Berrien, Boston Cops and Black Churches, PUB. INT., Summer 1999, at 52.
83. Michael Paulson, Church Closings Alarm Immigrants: Parishes Help Save Cultures, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 9, 2004, at Al.
84. See Boston.com, Parishes Slated for Closure, http://www.boston.com/news/specials/parishes/
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not be as immediately apparent as the impact of reconfiguration on direct
service provision, the consequences of reconfiguration are likely to be equally
adverse in both contexts. The police collaboration studies suggest that without
the assistance of local nongovernmental institutions, government agencies will
often have more difficulty building the trust necessary to accomplish their own
social service missions. In closing churches and removing important social
institutions from neighborhoods without engaging in consultation with state
and local governments, the Archdiocese failed to address the potential
destabilizing effects of its actions, particularly in poorer urban communities in
which there are fewer institutional anchors.
III. UNWORKABLE COMPROMISES
As the Archdiocese moved ahead with its reconfiguration plans, state and
local governments scrambled to find ways to mitigate the impact that the parish
closures would have upon the governmental provision of social services. From
this concern emerged three different approaches, which can roughly be
categorized as regulatory, legislative, and diplomatic. Although each had its
strengths, none was ultimately successful, for the reasons set forth below.
A. Regulatory Approaches
The initial regulatory approach came from Massachusetts Secretary of State
William Galvin. Throughout early 2004, Galvin explored various legal avenues
that would have provided the Commonwealth with a measure of influence over
the parish closings. In one instance, Galvin sought to determine whether his
position as the chairman of the Massachusetts Historical Commission provided
him with authority to protect or landmark individual church buildings that had
been deemed historically significant-either through law or by being allowed
to provide financial assistance that would permit essential maintenance to be
conducted on the structures themselves. 85 Although in 1990 the Jesuits won a
significant preservation case against the historic designation of the interior of
Immaculate Conception church in Boston's South End,86 Galvin argued that in
that case, the religious order opposed the designation. Galvin believed that
here, many churches would welcome the designation (and the assistance that
the designation would bring). This innovative approach failed to gain any
significant traction, however, largely because the Archdiocese argued that it
both owned the parish properties and opposed any such designation.
87
list (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
85. Michael Paulson, Preservationists Fear Church Closings, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2004, at
Al.
86. Soc'y of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
87. Several churches slated for closure did seek to challenge their closure on historic preservation
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Galvin then sought to determine whether his authority (and/or that of the
Attorney General, Tom Reilly) over nonprofit and charitable organizations
could be employed to block the reallocation of gifts that had been given to
specific parishes. Parishioners in some parishes argued that their financial and
in-kind donations to the parish had been for the use of the parish alone, and
could not therefore be transferred (either to other parishes or to other
Archdiocesan uses) without the express consent of the donors. While this
approach did meet with some notable initial success after the actual closings
were announced,88 the effectiveness of this approach in leveraging significant
influence over the prospective closing decisions of the Archdiocese was
minimal to nonexistent.
In a somewhat analogous regulatory maneuver, several local governments
attempted to use their zoning authority to thwart or delay the closure of local
parishes once the closures were announced. 89 Yet this regulatory gambit
likewise had little or no effect upon the closure decisions and did little to help
local governments prepare for the social and community consequences of those
closures.
B. Legislative Approaches
Despite Secretary Galvin's efforts to find some legal angle through which
to have the views of state government recognized in the reconfiguration
process, the Archdiocese ultimately proceeded on its own schedule and
announced the closings on May 25, 2004. In the days immediately following
grounds, including one church (St. Jeremiah's in Framingham) which argued that its bells--donated in
memory of Challenger astronaut and former parishioner Christa McAuliffe-were sufficient to merit
special consideration of the church itself as a historic landmark. See Michael Paulson, 10 of 82 Parishes
Fight Archdiocese on Closure Plans, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2004, at Al.
88. In August, 2004, the Archdiocese announced that the Attorney General would be exercising his
authority over the use of charitable funds to regulate the "disposition of millions of dollars in money and
gifts" that may have been legally restricted when they were initially donated to the eighty-two parishes
slated for closure. Michael Paulson, AG Gains Oversight of Assets at Parishes, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
19, 2004, at Al. This decision expanded an ad hoc approach begun in June, 2004, when parishioners
from one parish were successfully able to petition the Archdiocese to refrain from spending or
reallocating a school fund that, they argued, was set up solely for the use of their local parish school.
Jonathan Salzman & Suzanne Sataline, Church Seeks AG's Opinion on School Fund, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 5, 2004, at Al.
89. Local governments in communities including Revere, West Newton, Gloucester, and Milton
pursued variants of this zoning authority approach. This tactic generally consisted of attempting to
"downzone" the land on which the church sat. The goal of such actions was to effectively prohibit the
high-density development opportunities that would make the properties attractive to large-scale
commercial developers. There are, however, legal questions concerning whether these changes
constitute illegal "spot zoning" or violate the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). See, e.g., Kathy McCabe, Revere Wants Say on New Use for Church, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 6, 2004, at North 1; Sara Perkings, Parish, Town Raise Concern Over Closing of St. Pius X
Greater Communication by Diocesan Officials Requested, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), June 21,
2004, at 13; Matt Viser & Erica Noonan, Church Says Zoning Change Won't Stop Parish Closing,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 2004, at West 1.
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the closure announcement, Galvin then switched gears, turning his attention
from regulatory solutions to legislative ones. On May 28, Galvin stated that he
would file legislation in the Massachusetts Legislature that would require
religious organizations to report to the state details of large-scale financial
transactions.9" "I don't do this lightly as I know it will be considered treading
on the separation of church and state, but it's absolutely not that," said
Galvin.91 "It is an attempt to force some transparency on an institution that is
making decisions on millions of dollars of property that affect thousands of
people throughout Greater Boston."92  Under Galvin's bill, religious
organizations would retain their traditional exemption from filing annual
reports except in years when the organization had completed sales of real estate
or other assets in excess of $2 million.93 While this legislation eventually found
a sponsor,94 it was soundly defeated in a lopsided 147-3 vote in the
Massachusetts House in January 2006, under criticisms that it infringed too
heavily upon the separation of church and state.95 Aside from this single
legislative threat, it does not appear that any other political actors attempted to
fashion a legislative solution that would cushion the blow that the parish
closures would deliver to government and communities.
C. Diplomatic Approaches
The corollary to the legislative approach is the diplomatic approach.
Numerous civic leaders attempted to engage the Archdiocese in some form of
consultation during the first six months of 2004, but the Archdiocese repeatedly
declined these overtures during the reconfiguration process. For example, in
March, the director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority-the city's chief
planning agency-urged the Archdiocese to work with the city on a master plan
to lessen the impact of the parish closures. 96 Yet according to a Boston





94. Paulson, supra note 87 (reporting that State Senator Marian Walsh had circulated draft
legislation that would "require religious organizations to file annual financial reports like those now
filed by nonreligious charitable organizations and that would require charitable organizations, including
churches, to report their real estate holdings.").
95. See Scott Helman, House Rejects Disclosure of Religious Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26,
2006, at Al. In April, 2006, the Archdiocese did voluntarily disclose audited financial reports for FY
2004 and FY 2005, as Archbishop O'Malley stated that his reason for making the public disclosures was
to rebuild trust between the Archdiocese and the community. Michael Paulson, Church Tackles $46M
Gap; Financial Disclosures Win Praise, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 2006, at Al. Notably, this disclosure
came after significant public pressure, and nearly two years after the first parishes were designated for
closure under the reconfiguration proposal. For the complete Archdiocesan financial disclosure
documents, see Archdiocese of Boston, Financial Transparency, http://rcab.org/Finance/HomePage.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
96. A Mass on the Common, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2004, at A14.
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Redevelopment Authority spokeswoman, "the [A]rchdiocese has shown little
interest in such a process . . . .97 Similarly, the Archdiocese refused to send a
representative to a March hearing held by the Boston City Council regarding
the effect that the closures would have on the public school system, despite the
legitimate concerns of the city ranging from school transportation to teacher
assignment schedules.98 This continued reticence from the Archdiocese,
particularly as the date for the closure announcement approached, prompted a
mixture of resentment and helplessness among government officials.
Finally, on May 29, 2004, the Archdiocese and Mayor of Boston Thomas
Menino announced that the Archdiocese and the City of Boston had agreed to
work together in order to find new homes for the social services that would be
displaced because of the closings. 99 Boston was the municipality that was hit
hardest by the closings, both in terms of the absolute number of parishes to be
closed (twelve) and the neediness of the communities in which those parishes
were located. A relieved Mayor Menino emphasized the importance of this
agreement, noting that "these churches are more than places of worship. They
are community services centers for many of these neighborhoods."' 00 This
agreement was significant in that it was the first major acknowledgment by the
Archdiocese that the secular community would be adversely affected by the
parish closings.
The value of this agreement should not be overstated, however, for a
number of reasons. First, it was in no way preordained that such a compromise
would occur, and without the insistence of the powerful Boston political
establishment, such a compromise might not have ever been reached. It is
worth observing that the Boston agreement came over six months after the
announcement that the parish closing process would commence, and four days
after the specific closing announcements. Second, it is crucial to note that
diplomatic solutions are often ad hoc and nonuniform; indeed, in the situation
outlined above, it is not entirely clear why the Archdiocese eventually decided
to collaborate with the City of Boston in the manner in which it did. Moreover,
there is no evidence that similar compromises were reached between the
Archdiocese and the governmental leaders in smaller Massachusetts
communities-precisely the communities in which the secular services
provided by churches are proportionally the most important. To the contrary, in
June 2004, town leaders in Milton were still pleading for greater Archdiocesan
communication,' ° 1 in July, selectmen in Arlington were still seeking more
97. Id.
98. Church-City Teamwork, supra note 68.
99. Stephen Kurkjian, Closings Spur O'Malley, Menino To Vow Joint Effort: Seek New Sites for
Service Programs, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 2004, at D9.
100. Id.
101. Perkings,supra note 89.
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details of Archdiocesan plans for two churches slated for closure, 102 and in
August, the Mayor of Salem was still seeking the cooperation of the
Archdiocese in addressing the loss of crucial social services. As the Mayor of
Salem wrote to the Archbishop, "Saint Joseph's parishioners are struggling
with the loss of their church as well as the loss of important community
services that the church provides. We need time to identify those services and
to study the opportunities that the site presents."' 0 3 Ironically, on August 5, an
archdiocesan spokesman noted approvingly that the Archdiocese had "started a
conversation with the communities," without noting the fact that such
conversations were only being instigated nearly eight months after the closure
process was begun.'0 4 In short, it was almost inevitable that a solution based
purely on negotiation would lead to suboptimal results, particularly when one
player held all of the cards-and knew it.
D. The Unworkable Compromises
The three main approaches taken by state and local government during the
reconfiguration process failed for several reasons. First, the approaches taken
by government relied upon only one of the three approaches, to the relative
exclusion of the others. For example, the approaches relied upon either (a) the
use of laws or regulations to force the Archdiocese to make what might be
termed substantive concessions, or (b) diplomatic efforts whose success or
failure depended entirely upon the Archdiocese's willingness to acquiesce.
Second, all of the "solutions" proffered by government were comprised largely
of ad hoc measures. As such, they provided neither well-designed strategies for
uniform implementation nor systematic safeguards that could prevent similar
problems from arising in the future.
Third, and most important, the regulatory and legislative solutions pursued
by government were directed toward attempting to prevent closures, rather than
toward addressing the only complaint to which the government had a colorable
claim: concerns over the fairness of the closure process in relation to the public.
While those in government may have been legitimately frustrated by the
perceived unfairness of the results of the Archdiocesan reconfiguration, this
unfairness was simply not within their authority to redress. Indeed, there is
absolutely no serious dispute that the Archdiocese had the legal right to
internally reorganize its affairs. As one Boston civil liberties attorney noted,
"[t]here's no question that the church has the right to open and close parishes
102. Christine McConville, Selectmen Want Say in Reuse of Churches, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22,
2004, at Northwest 2.
103. Steven Rosenberg, Mayor Wants St. Joseph's Closing Delayed, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 5,
2004, at North 2.
104. Christine McConville, Church Closings Kindle Anxiety over Future Uses, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 5, 2004, at Northwest 1.
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and doesn't need the permission of the government to do so. ... ."105 Instead,
the government should have focused its energy on ways to redress the
perceived unfairness of the process of the Archdiocesan reconfiguration, to the
extent that this process created significant negative externalities for the public
provision of social welfare services. In failing to make this crucial distinction,
government and the Archdiocese engaged in a battle that left both sides
weaker-and communities as the real loser.
IV. THE PROCEDURAL STATUTE ALTERNATIVE
As was noted above, the regulatory and legislative approaches failed
because they attempted to create a substantive legal "sword" for the state to use
against recalcitrant nonprofits, whereas the diplomatic solution failed because it
relied solely on the goodwill of an unwilling party. However, no party
considered a "third way" that would have drawn upon the advantages of all
three approaches in order to reach a solution that would have addressed the
underlying problem faced by government: the rapid, widespread, and
unplanned loss of social services, the absence of which would leave a hole that
state and local resources would need to fill.
This Note proposes that this "third way" is the little-used procedural statute.
As is discussed in detail below, such a statute would provide the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General with the option to participate-as nonbinding
consulting parties-in the closure or transformation of a nonprofit entity when
such changes would have the potential to significantly and adversely affect the
ability of government to perform its social welfare functions. By virtue of being
solely procedural, nonadversarial, generally applicable, and content-neutral,
such a statute would avoid potential First Amendment conflicts. Moreover, by
being narrowly focused on the colorable concerns of government, such a statute
would potentially prove less confrontational and more effective than a purely
legislative or regulatory "legalistic" approach. In sum, a procedural statute,
designed as described in detail below, would meld the legal and the diplomatic,
create a framework for resolving future similar scenarios, and help lay the
groundwork for improved relations between all parties involved. Finally,
although this Note uses Massachusetts as an example due to the topical
relevance of the Boston case study, this proposed statute is designed to be
transferable to almost any other state with only minimal changes, particularly
as state nonprofit law is fairly similar in respect to the structural and legal
issues raised below.
105. Paulson, supra note 42.
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A. The Statutory Vehicle
Procedural statutes differ from substantive statutes in that although the
procedures outlined therein must be followed, the decisionmaker subject to the
procedural statute (in this instance, the Archdiocese, although the statute would
apply to any nonprofit) is in no way bound by the results. These types of
statutes, which could be also described as "information-forcing" statutes,10 6 are
much less common than their substantive cousins. Most likely, this discrepancy
results from the desire of legislators to demonstrate "results" for their
constituents-and if given the option to legislate either procedurally or
substantively, few would choose the former when the latter is a viable
alternative. Nevertheless, procedural statutes are an integral component of the
legislative arsenal and have been used successfully to great effect. The most
prominent example of a procedural statute is the federal National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), passed in 1970.107 Any federal agency
planning a major project (such as damming a river, constructing a highway, or
filling wetlands) is required to comply with NEPA by engaging in an
assessment of the environmental effects of the proposed action, consulting with
appropriate third parties, and publishing an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS).108 Once the federal agency has completed these procedural steps in good
faith, the agency is free to continue the project. Importantly, the agency is
under no obligation to cease or even to alter the proposed project-even if the
EIS finds that the project will create significant detrimental environmental
impacts. 1° 9 Indeed, NEPA has been characterized as a "stop, look, and listen"
statute,110 the main benefit of which is ensuring that agencies take a "hard look"
at the potential consequences of their proposed actions. 1 1 Put simply: if the
consultative obligations have been met, the entire intent of the statute has been
fulfilled.
Although to some this process may look like merely "delaying the
106. For a thorough discussion of the concept of "information-forcing" rule systems, see Ian Ayres
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104
YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000); see also, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) ("The only role for a court [under NEPA] is to insure that the
agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
108. During this process, interested parties have the right to submit testimony or other
documentation evidence about the impact of the proposed project on the environment, and the agency
itself needs to write a report detailing the agency's own studies of the impact of the project and the steps
it has taken to mitigate those impacts.
109. As the Supreme Court held in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
350-51 (1989), "NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary
process .... NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action."
110. Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1994).
111. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.
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inevitable," the hope is that if significant impacts are identified during the
procedural consultative period, the federal agencies will work with those
concerned to reach a mutually acceptable compromise-and indeed, this has
occurred in numerous environmental situations. To cite just a few examples,
the NEPA consultation process encouraged the United States Department of
Agriculture during the mid-1980s to control gypsy moth infestations in Oregon
by spraying less-toxic alternative pesticides, 1 2 convinced the United States
Navy in 2003 to mitigate the impact that a new airfield in North Carolina would
have on migratory bird habitats,11 3 and is credited with the ongoing successful
collaboration at Colorado's Canyon of the Ancients National Monument
between the Bureau of Land Management and environmental groups, creating a
"win-win situation that balanced energy exploration with cultural resource
,114protection .... Moreover, while it might be expected that federal agencies
would generally resent the imposition and delays caused by NEPA
consultation, many agencies have actually embraced the value of the NEPA
process. For instance, the federal Department of Energy publishes a
quadrennial newsletter devoted to NEPA compliance entitled Lessons Learned
Quarterly Report, which acknowledged unequivocally that "[t]he quality of our
NEPA process affects the quality of DOE's decisions.' '115 In sum, NEPA's
procedural requirements frequently enable the agencies involved to make
clearer and more effective decisions than they might otherwise make.
In the context of the Archdiocesan reconfiguration, the main concern of
state and local governments was that the parish closings would adversely affect
both the provision of social services and community stability. As the NEPA
example illustrates, this type of situation-one in which an otherwise legal
action has the potential to create adverse externalities-is a perfect candidate
for a procedural statute. In this instance, the solution would be for the
Massachusetts legislature to enact a general procedural statute applicable to all
state nonprofits (not just religious organizations) that operate under the
charitable corporation statute." 6 The procedural legislation would amend the
current statutory provision for dissolution of a nonprofit public charity, which
currently mandates that the Attorney General be party to the dissolution of the
112. Sierra Club, NEPA Legal Process Encourages Creative Problem Solving, Public Participation
and Decision Making Based on Sound Data: 8 NEPA Success Stories, at 3 (2005),
http://www.sierraclub.org/lookbeforeyouleap/litigation-stories.pdf
113. Id.at2.
114. Wilderness Soc'y, Measure Twice. Cut Once., at 3 (2005), http://www.wilderness.org/
Library/Documents/upload/NEPA-SuccessStories-20051021 .pdf.
115. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Inside Lessons Learned, LESSONS LEARNED Q. REP., June 2006, at 2,
http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/process/ ll/JUNE2006LLQR.pdf.
116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, § 4 (2006) (concerning corporations established for charitable and
certain other purposes). The statute defines a permissible nonprofit entity to include an entity forrned for
"any civic, educational, charitable, benevolent or religious purpose." Id.
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nonprofit and the reallocation of its assets. 17 This new provision would be
triggered whenever any nonprofit entity engaged-or had reason to believe that
it would imminently engage-in consolidation actions that had the potential to
create significant adverse effects on the governmental provision of social
services.
The determination of whether this threshold of "significant adverse effect"
had been reached in any given case would be made in one of three ways. First,
a potentially eligible action could be self-reported directly by the reconfiguring
organization itself (although this method is unlikely to be the predominant
mode of determination, for obvious reasons). Second, the Attorney General or
Secretary of State would be empowered to make such a determination after
reviewing the request of either a state agency or a private individual. Third, the
Attorney General or Secretary of State could make such a determination sua
sponte.
Once a consolidation action was deemed eligible for application of this
procedural statute, the Attorney General and/or Secretary of State would then
reserve the option to become involved in the consolidation process in a
nonbinding consulting party capacity. If the Attorney General and/or Secretary
of State exercised this option, the nonprofit in question would then have the
legal obligation to provide reasonable and timely notice of a potential
consolidation to the Attorney General and/or Secretary of State, meet with the
Attorney General and/or Secretary of State to discuss the potential impact of
the consolidation on the provision of public services, and to engage in good-
faith consultation with these parties in an attempt to minimize any adverse
effects of the consolidation on the citizens of the Commonwealth. Finally, this
statute would be neutral and of general applicability, applying equally and
impartially to all nonprofits as recognized by the state under the charitable
corporation statute.
B. Advantages of a Procedural Statute
There are several advantages of a procedural statute in this situation. The
first advantage is that procedural statutes are mandatory yet ultimately
nonbinding. As the failure of the "diplomatic approach" demonstrated, the
Archdiocese was not inherently inclined to respond in a timely manner to
requests for negotiation and communication. As such, obtaining consultation
was probably possible only if the Archdiocese faced a legal obligation to do so.
By the same token, the "legislative approach" demonstrated that the attempt to
implement substantively binding (as opposed to merely procedurally binding)
legal measures could be counterproductive and, ultimately, largely
117. Id. §8A (2004).
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unsuccessful. The procedural approach advocated herein would forge a
compromise between these two poles-creating a legal obligation requiring
nonprofit organizations to consult with government, but ultimately permitting
the nonprofit to act as it wished. Moreover, it is critical to emphasize that the
nonbinding nature of the procedural statute means that a nonprofit
organization's administrative and financial burden for compliance would likely
be quite minimal, consisting largely of providing timely notice to government
and acting in good faith. While neither guaranteed nor designed to change the
ultimate outcome, such a compromise would provide the opportunity for
discussion between the affected parties in a way that was missing from the
instant situation.
A second advantage of a procedural statute is that procedural statutes are
less adversarial than their substantive counterparts. Many substantive statutes
are triggered by discretionary determinations, and organizations subject to
those statutes frequently attempt to avoid the substantive effects by disputing
the fact that a discretionary threshold has actually been reached. For example, if
a statute required the payment of a fine in the event of a company creating
"substantial" pollution, the parties involved would often find themselves in
court, arguing before a jury about whether the statutory threshold for
"substantial" had been accurately assessed. However, because procedural
statutes are ultimately only consultative and nonbinding, there is often less of a
rationale for challenging the discretionary application of such a statute on the
grounds that it will be burdensome or carry significant substantive
consequences. This can be illustrated vividly by looking at the litigation created
in the NEPA context. While parties do litigate over the adequacy of NEPA
filings, typically only about 150 such lawsuits are filed nationwide every
year118-representing less than 1% of the actions that generate NEPA
documents annually. 119 Instead, negotiation and discussion seem to be the
preferred alternatives.120
This difference between procedural and substantive statutes would
therefore significantly reduce the likelihood that a nonprofit would sue to
prevent the application of the statute, or that the organization would need to be
118. Council on Envtl. Quality, U.S. Dep't of Energy, NEPA Litigation Surveys 2001-2004 (Nov.
15, 2006), http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/NEPA/nepanet.htm.
119. Sierra Club, supra note 112, at I.
120. See, e.g., Earthjustice, Citizens and Army Settle Lawsuit, Sept. 27, 1999,
http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/999/citizens_andarmysettle_lawsuit.html (noting that the U.S.
Army agreed to stop conducting training at a Hawaiian military base until it had worked with local
groups to assess comprehensively the environmental impacts of such training); Wilderness Soc'y, Bush
Visits Central Oregon, Location of the Metolius Basin Forest Management Plan,
http://www.wildemess.org/Library/Documents/MetoliusBasin20030821 .cfm (last visited Dec. 15, 2006)
("Working under the guidelines of [NEPA], the Forest Service... picked a less environmentally
harmful alternative that will provide for the thinning of smaller diameter trees to reduce fire risk and
promote forest health on 12,600 acres, while also protecting endangered species habitat.").
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sued by the state in order to enforce the right of the Attorney General and/or the
Secretary of State to be included in consultation. This advantage of the
procedural statute is particularly important in the case of religious nonprofits,
given First Amendment concerns about the applicability of statutes that could
unduly burden religion. Although such challenges to the proposed procedural
statute would likely fail under the general applicability doctrine of Employment
Division v. Smith,12 1 the fact that the statute is "procedural only" would reduce
significantly the likelihood of such acrimonious and adversarial challenges
being brought in the first place.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the use of a procedural statute in
circumstances such as this would actually serve the best interest of all parties
involved. No legitimate nonprofit social service provider would want the
community it serves to suffer due solely to the organization's own internal
financial or managerial difficulties. Indeed, most social service providers that
are forced to close or redirect their resources have an abiding interest in
ensuring that the community that the organization had been serving continues
to receive the services it needs, even if that particular provider is no longer
capable of meeting those needs. Similarly, the government has an interest in
learning about potentially major disruptions in crucial social services provided
by nonprofits, in order to develop a plan for addressing the gaps in service
provision that might otherwise ensue. A procedural statute would cool the
power struggle between these two parties and would instead allow them to
focus on their common interest: meeting the needs of the communities which
would suffer if the parties failed to collaborate.
C. Executive Authority
The executive authority for the provisions of the statute would rest with the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General, who already hold the legal
authority for overseeing the actions of Massachusetts nonprofit
organizations.122 Under Massachusetts law, the Secretary of State has the
responsibility to regulate the incorporation, consolidation, merger, and
dissolution of nonprofit organizations.' 23 This power exists in order to ensure
the Commonwealth that its nonprofit organizations are adhering to the
requirement that nonprofits have a charitable purpose, and that the nonprofit
121. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith held that the application of a valid and neutral law of general
applicability to religious conduct or organizations did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.
122. Such powers are not unique to Massachusetts; in every state, there is a state officer (usually
the Secretary of State or the Attorney General) who has legal authority over nonprofit entities.
Massachusetts is used herein only as an illustrative example, as a statute such as the one proposed in this
Note would be flexible enough to be adapted and implemented in other states with minimal changes.
123. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, §§ 3A, 5, 7, 10A, 11, 1 IA, 11B (2006).
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form is not being compromised (in the case of reorganization) or abused (in the
case of dissolution). 124 The Attorney General has the responsibility for
enforcing nonprofit law on behalf of the citizens of the Commonwealth,
ensuring that nonprofits do not engage in activities that would be improper
(either because of their nonprofit status or because the activities are illegal per
se).125 For example, the Attorney General has the responsibility to review the
conversion of hospitals from nonprofit to for-profit status, in order to ensure
that due care was followed, conflicts of interest were avoided, and that the
proposed transaction was "in the public interest."
12
6
In the case of the proposed procedural statute, the main advantage of
vesting the executive authority in the Secretary of State and Attorney General is
that no new oversight entity needs to be created. Indeed, it is already accepted
that these executive offices have the authority to regulate and govern the
operation of nonprofit entities regardless of their religious or secular nature.
This new statutory obligation would merely be an extension of their existing
responsibilities, which they execute in relation to both religious and
nonreligious nonprofits alike.
An additional reason to vest the execution of this statute in the traditional
oversight authority of the Secretary of State and Attorney General is that under
existing Massachusetts law, there is no explicit or implicit "private right of
action" against a nonprofit for breach of the charitable corporation statute.
1 27
Under Massachusetts law, the right of action against nonprofits for violations of
fiduciary duties or other noncompliance with the nonprofit statute is reserved to
the Secretary of State or Attorney General.i28 Indeed, the public can only
petition the Secretary of State or Attorney General to enforce the law against a
noncompliant nonprofit, and the Secretary of State and/or Attorney General
retains the discretion as to whether or not doing so would be in the public
interest. In the instant case, the proposed procedural statute would merely
amend a statute under which the Secretary of State and Attorney General
already retain such executive authority.' 9 Under the proposed statute, these
124. See, e.g., id. § 5 (investigation of proposed charitable corporations), § 7 (amendment of
articles of organization or change of purposes), § 10 (consolidation and merger), § I lIB (involuntary
dissolution of corporation constituting a public charity).
125. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 8 to 8N (2006). See also, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, §
8A (disposition of corporate assets), § I B (involuntary dissolution of corporation constituting a public
charity). See generally Mass. Att'y Gen., About the Division of Public Charities,
http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid= 1211 (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
126. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, § 8A(d)(l) (2006).
127. Frequently, state civil statutes provide allegedly aggrieved parties with a private right of
action, thereby enabling private parties to sue the alleged offender directly for statutory violations. In the
case of a procedural statute, a private right of action (were it to be permitted) would provide a private
party with the right to sue in order to require the entity subject to the statute to engage in consultation.
128. This is almost universally true in other states as well, as the authority to bring derivative suits
against nonprofit entities in the name of the public is vested in the Attorney General.
129. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 8, 8H, 81 (2006).
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two officers would have the sole discretion to determine whether the action of a
nonprofit would place a "substantial" burden on the governmental provision of
public services, and would also have the sole discretion to decide whether or
not the state should exercise its right to consult. Because of this extremely
limited and transparent right of enforcement-grounded in an existing and
accepted statutory authority-nonprofits could therefore be assured that there
would be no frivolous or private ad hoc attempts to enforce the statute's
procedural consultation requirements.
D. Legal Authority and the First Amendment Religion Clauses
The legal authority for this procedural statute would derive primarily from
the common law right of the legislature to pass laws of general applicability-
in this instance, laws that affect either for-profit or nonprofit entities operating
within the Commonwealth. As such, it is essential to address the inevitable
concerns about whether the proposed statute would create impermissible First
Amendment conflicts. Indeed, the creativity of state and local government in
dealing with the Archdiocesan reorganization has been stymied by what the
state apparently perceives to be insurmountable First Amendment barriers. As
the Attorney General's spokesperson Corey Welford noted, "the attorney
general's authority over charities is specifically limited in the case of religious
institutions. That limitation is mandated by the First Amendment's recognition
of a separation of church and state."'1 30 However, this deference to the First
Amendment is misplaced in the instant context because it suggests that the
options available to the state are much more limited than is actually the case.
Clearly, in the realm of secular nonprofit organizations, the state is able to
exert the full extent of its police power authority. Because the state has the sole
power to incorporate secular nonprofit entities, the state can use legislation or
regulation to impose upon these organizations any reasonable requirements that
it wishes. In contrast, the state is more restricted in its relationship with
religious nonprofits because of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment.
Yet the Religion Clauses are not fatal to the constitutionality of the
proposed statute, for the following two reasons. First, the statute would almost
certainly be deemed constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause if it is
generally applicable and facially neutral, the test set forth in the Supreme
Court's landmark opinion in Employment Division v. Smith.131 In the instant
context, the proposed statute would be applicable to all nonprofits-religious
and secular alike-and would not target religious nonprofits in particular in any
way. Indeed, religious nonprofits already routinely comply with other laws of
130. Paulson, supra note 87.
131. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
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general applicability, ranging from those on employment discrimination to
those on zoning, without any serious questions about First Amendment
infringement. Moreover, the Attorney General and Secretary of State routinely
exercise their general nonprofit authority over religious organizations,
particularly when religious organizations engage in activities that, while not
impermissible outside the nonprofit context, are impermissible for nonprofits
per se (such as extensive political or lobbying activities). 32 Because the
Attorney General already has the responsibility and authority to ensure that all
nonprofit entities meet the generally applicable statutory nonprofit standards,
any facially neutral and generally applicable amendment to those statutory
standards would not per se infringe upon First Amendment protections under
the standards set forth in Smith. 1
33
Second, even if the proposed statute were challenged successfully as being
either non-neutral or non-generally applicable, the proposed statute would still
likely meet the more stringent test set forth by the Supreme Court in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.134 In Lukumi, the Court required that
statutes failing the Smith test needed to demonstrate that they were "justified by
a compelling governmental interest and... narrowly tailored to advance that
interest."' 35 Here, the state would be able to meet both of these high standards.
Turning to the first prong, it is indisputable that the government has a compelling
interest in ensuring that its citizens receive the services to which they are either
statutorily or constitutionally entitled. Although religious organizations are under
no obligation to provide social services that ease the burden of government, it is
also indisputable that government allocates its limited social services resources
based upon whether or not those services are being augmented by an alternative
provider in any given area. For example, while the government has a legal
obligation to provide a school place to every school-aged child in the
Commonwealth, both state and local governments allocate funding to schools
based upon the number of children who are actually present in the public
system.' 3 6 In this way, and in numerous similar situations, the government relies
upon the private provision of social services in planning how to deliver its own,
and it has a legitimate compelling governmental interest in being kept informed
as to how its own provision of services may be adversely affected by the actions
of nonprofit entities. Requiring all nonprofits to engage in nonbinding
governmental consultation in such situations would provide the government with
the opportunity to restructure its own service provision strategy-something
132. See, e.g., Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS
Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001).
133. See generally id.
134. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
135. Id. at 531-32.
136. See supra note 67; see also supra note 73.
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government would not have found necessary except for the cessation of
external nonprofit activities upon which government had reasonably relied.
The proposed statute would also almost certainly meet the second Lukumi
requirement, that it be "narrowly tailored" to advance the compelling
governmental interest. Even if passed, the constitutional problem that the
Galvin legislation would face is that the requirement for churches to release
financial records has little to do with the legitimate state interest of ensuring an
orderly reallocation of social services resources. While the record release
requirement might make religious organizations think twice about engaging in
large property transactions, the state has little colorable authority to interfere in
the otherwise legal financial transactions of religious organizations. Such an
approach would therefore likely be deemed too blunt an instrument under
Lukumi for advancing the legitimate governmental interest of social services
provision. By contrast, it would be difficult to argue that the proposed
procedural statute, directed as it is at specifically addressing a compelling
interest of government in immediately providing social services to the needy,
was too broad or intrusive to qualify as narrowly tailored under Lukumi.
E. Summary of the Proposal
As was noted in Part II, the reconfiguration process pursued by the
Archdiocese created significant confusion, uncertainty, and animosity. These
problems would likely have been mitigated considerably if the proposed
procedural statute had been in effect, for three reasons. First, this statute would
have provided government with the time and information necessary to design
an action strategy and to develop the physical and personnel infrastructure
necessary to fill the void left by the reconfiguration. Second, by virtue of being
a permanent statutory solution, it would have avoided many of the problems
that plague ad hoc solutions, including the frequent controversies about who
has authority to demand what from whom. Such ad hoc approaches frequently
create sound and fury while ultimately signifying nothing, consuming valuable
time, energy, resources, and goodwill in the process. Finally, although the
statute would create a "legal obligation to engage in diplomacy," its procedural
nature would give government a voice without giving government control.
Indeed, bringing a new voice into the reconfiguration process might even lead
to more creative solutions-solutions that would balance both the
reorganization goals of nonprofits and the planning needs of government. This
reassurance of autonomy for nonprofit organizations would almost certainly
help to improve relations between government and nonprofits. Given these
advantages, it appears that a procedural statute-combining the legal and the




V. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS AND CONCERNS
Despite the advantages of the proposed procedural statute, legitimate
criticisms and concerns can be raised against it. On one side are those who may
feel that this solution does not go far enough, and argue that this solution is of
only limited effectiveness. On the other side are those who might believe
instead that this solution goes too far, and argue that this proposal would either
be unenforceable or would create a "chilling effect" in the nonprofit provision
of social services. This Part anticipates these concerns by addressing each one
directly and illustrating why each is unlikely to create significant problems for
the practical implementation of the proposed statute.
A. Response to Concerns that This Proposal Is Too Limited
The first major potential public policy concern is that this particular
statutory response, even if implemented as designed, would fail to make any
noticeable or positive impact-in other words, that such a statute would merely
delay the inevitable. This Section addresses two of the strongest potential
criticisms in this regard, both of which originate from critics who would argue
that the procedural statute option does not go far enough: first, that the statute
would be too limited in scope to be of any practical use, and second, that the
statute would merely create another bureaucratic process while having little or
no impact upon substantive outcomes.
The first concern, regarding the limitations of statutory scope, comes from
those who suggest that, in the context of parish reconfiguration, the
Archdiocese would likely find it very easy-perhaps too easy-to satisfy its
obligations under the proposed statute. For example, in the case of a threatened
suburban parish that offers few social services, under the proposed statute the
government involvement in such a closure would likely be extremely limited.
Therefore, the critics' argument goes, the proposed statute will do very little (if
anything) to prevent the closure of that parish. Empirically, this argument is
almost certainly true: the statute will likely be triggered more frequently with
regard to urban and rural parishes than suburban ones, given that it is parishes
in the neediest areas that tend to provide the largest proportion of social
services.
However, this line of criticism fundamentally misconstrues the premise of
the proposed statute. Put plainly, the proposed statute is not designed to
provide a thinly disguised legal pretext for actively preventing the closure of
specific parishes-even though a secondary effect of a successful consultation
might be a recognition by the Archdiocese (after "stopping, looking, and
listening") that a particular parish should remain open. It is absolutely critical
to recognize that the statute is designed to assist the state in managing its social
service obligations, not to prevent nonprofits from acting within their own legal
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authority to manage their internal affairs. Indeed, the statute's purpose will be
fulfilled as long as the government has the opportunity to work with the
Archdiocese to identify (and design plans to assist) the geographic areas that
will suffer the most in terms of social service provision upon the closure of
local parishes.
The fact that the proposed statutory scope is limited is a hard pill to
swallow for many of those angered by the parish closings, for whom the ideal
solution would be for the legislature to fashion a statute that would give the
state substantive rights to stop closures. Yet constitutionally (and practically),
such legislation is a nonstarter. Is the procedural statute the second-best
alternative in these circumstances? Undoubtedly. The real question must be
whether a procedural statute, with its potential for influencing decisionmaking
through dialogue, information-provision, and persuasion, is better than the
alternative of no consultation at all.
The second criticism is that a purely procedural statute will do little to
change the mind of an organization-particularly if that organization is not
legally required to take account of the results of the process. A corollary
criticism is that imposing such procedural conditions merely creates more
bureaucracy without generating a solution to the underlying problem. Yet
although a procedural statute may appear at first to be an exercise that requires
mere "hoop-jumping" before arriving at a foregone conclusion, two lessons
from other contexts in which procedural statutes have been used demonstrate
that this is not necessarily the case.
First, it is important to understand that in many real-life situations, the mere
requirement that an entity comply with procedural statutes has led to a better,
more inclusive, and more thoughtful decision making process. Returning to the
NEPA example, there are numerous instances in which the federal agency
required to undertake a procedural NEPA review has altered, modified, or even
cancelled its initial project proposal because of the NEPA process. 137 In some
instances, the comments that the agency received during the process pointed to
new and innovative solutions that were both more cost effective and more
environmentally sound than those originally proposed. In other instances, the
prospective potential of receiving reasoned outside commentary was enough to
convince agencies to take a more thoughtful and reasoned approach toward
their initial project proposals.' 38 Again, these agencies were required to do no
137. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
138. Because these instances are evidenced by shifts in how agencies approach similar situations
over time, the observation of this effect requires a longitudinal evaluation of institutional culture. This
type of analysis is subtle and difficult to document, other than via instances in which a compromise has
been reached through public negotiation and/or comment. But see SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING
BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM 251 (1984) (arguing that NEPA has forced federal agencies to anticipate the environmental
consequences of their proposed actions, and that this has led to the abandonment of projects that might
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more than make a good-faith effort to meet their procedural statutory
obligations. Despite this fact, the input and observations of those who
participated in the nonbinding consultation process have frequently led the
agencies involved to make substantive changes. Second, it is important to
recognize that a procedural statute introduces a level of dignity into
proceedings-a level of dignity that is absent when decisions appear to be
made arbitrarily and without consultation. Convincing those affected that their
concerns have been adequately represented in the process is crucial if
organizations are to reduce the animosity and mistrust that result from
decisions made without the input of concerned stakeholders.'
1 39
There is, therefore, no reason that in analogous circumstances-such as an
Archdiocesan reconfiguration-similar results could not be achieved in many
(though by no means all) instances. Moreover, given the undeniable failure of
other, more traditional methods to fashion a meaningful governmental strategy
during the Boston Archdiocesan reconfiguration process, it is eminently
arguable that a statute like this one-which succeeded only occasionally-
would be more valuable than the hodgepodge of entirely unsuccessful ad hoc
approaches that eventually emerged in Boston during early 2004.
B. Response to Concerns that This Proposal Is Too Broad
The other set of potential concerns about the procedural statute will likely
come from critics who believe that this option goes too far.14 Some of these
critics might argue that the interplay between church and state will call the
validity and enforceability of this proposal into question. Others might argue
that this proposal creates an unintentional "chilling effect" on the provision of
social services by nonprofits (by discouraging them from engaging in activities
that they would otherwise have pursued), or imposes unnecessary
administrative burdens on nonprofits precisely when they are in the most need
of flexibility. This Section argues that far from being overbroad, the procedural
statute alternative provides clear limits on just how far the government may go
in dealing with nonprofits that are undergoing significant restructuring.
Turning first to concerns about validity and enforceability, the underlying
validity of the proposed statute seems most likely to arise in relation to its
constitutionality under the First Amendment. This issue has been discussed at
length in Section IV.D in the context of Smith and Lukumi, and it bears
repeating that a facially neutral and generally applicable statute-as this statute
would be-would likely pass the legal threshold for subjecting religious
otherwise have been pursued).
139. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
140. For example, some critics suggest that regardless of the collateral impact that parish closures
may have on social services, no level of governmental involvement in the closure process is acceptable.
See Richard W. Garnett, Downsizing and the Catholic Church, USA TODAY, July 17, 2006, at 13A.
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organizations to a narrowly tailored public regulation promulgated to meet a
compelling governmental interest. The more pressing potential criticism
concerns the enforceability of the statute against religious nonprofits who do
not voluntarily comply with its provisions. For example, it is conceivable that
the Archdiocese of Boston could refuse to comply with the statute, and, if sued
by the government to force compliance, argue that it has the exclusive right to
determine when it can be sued in secular courts on ecclesiastical matters.
However, existing case law suggests that this type of a challenge would not
likely succeed. Although the Archdiocese might argue that to grant
enforcement jurisdiction to the civil courts would violate the holdings of the
leading cases under the "church autonomy doctrine," 14 1 it is clear that the
application of this statute would be distinguishable from each of the major
church autonomy cases. Galich v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago presented an
issue similar to that in Boston, with parishioners seeking to enjoin an
Archdiocesan decision to close a church, whereas Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich concerned the civil appeal of the decision of a church
to suspend a bishop. In both cases, however, secular courts were being asked to
enjoin what was fundamentally an ecclesiastical decision-and in both
instances, the religious organization argued successfully that the civil courts did
not have the jurisdiction to make such a determination. These cases are
therefore distinguishable from the situation that would arise under the
procedural statute because the courts here would merely be asked to exercise
their civil authority to enforce a civil nonprofit law that applied to religious
organizations (as opposed to being asked to use their civil authority to compel
the application of a religious law).
Moreover, Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, while initially appearing to be
applicable, is, upon closer inspection, of little or no relevance. In Kedroff, the
Court noted that religious organizations should have "independence from
secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith
and doctrine." 142 However, the facts in Kedroff concerned New York state
legislation that would have effectively deposed the then-head of the Russian
Orthodox Church in the United States-an active intrusion into the governance
of the church in which the state "len[t] its power to one or the other side in [a]
controvers[y] over religious authority or dogma."' 143 In the instant situation,
however, there is no such intrusion into either authority or dogma, because the
proposed statute would not have any binding substantive impact upon the
141. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Galich v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 394 N.E.2d 572 (111.
App. 1979).
142. Kedroff 344 U.S. at 116.
143. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
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ultimate decision of the religious organization. Indeed, the proposed statute in
no way prevents the Archdiocese from closing any church that it chooses to
close (distinguishing this statute from the relief being sought by the
parishioners in Galich), nor does the proposed statute provide the state with any
rights either to propose specific parishes for closure or advocate for their
continuance. The statute merely requires that the nonprofit entity engage in
consultation with the state about mitigating the impact of the consolidation on
the state's own social services provision. In sum, such significant differences in
scope, process, and intended outcome strongly suggest that this statute does not
infringe upon the notion of church autonomy protected in the cases described
above.
Turning next to the criticism that the proposed statute would have a
"chilling effect" on churches and other nonprofit service providers, the specific
concern seems likely to be as follows: such a statute would cause these
organizations to avoid engaging in social service provision in the first place
because they would not wish to subject themselves to potential governmental
consultation if they decided to discontinue these activities at some future point.
The basis of this concern is the view that any difficulties created by
reorganizations are much less significant than the problems that would be
created if nonprofits avoided engaging in these activities in the first place.
Although it is certainly possible that some organizations may forego engaging
in these activities in order to avoid the potential of future governmental
consultation, this seems unlikely for four main reasons.
First, few organizations begin offering social services with the fatalistic
presumption that these services will be discontinued at some point in the future.
Second, the consultation obligation under the statute would be only procedural.
As such, it is unlikely that the desire to avoid potential governmental
consultation would be significant enough to outweigh the desire of an
organization to engage in social service provision. Third, for most religious
organizations, providing social services is an integral part of their social justice
mission. This fact makes it highly unlikely that religious organizations would
forego this aspect of their ministries simply because of a potential procedural
obligation at some future date. Fourth, it is worth reiterating that many religious
nonprofits (at both the parish and diocesan levels) already submit to other
generally applicable state regulations and laws in relation to their social
services. 144 The requirement that they do so has not prevented these
organizations from providing these services, and it is unlikely that an additional
procedural law such as the one proposed would have anything other than a
144. See, e.g., Catholic Charities (Archdiocese of Boston), Catholic Charities Child Care Program
in Malden Receives NAEYC Accreditation (Oct. 12, 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/
20041012052538/http://www.ccab.org/whats-new.htm (noting that the twelve child care programs run
by the Archdiocese of Boston are all licensed by the Massachusetts Office of.Child Care Services).
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negligible impact upon their decision to continue doing so.
Finally, some critics may argue that the procedural statute saddles nonprofit
organizations with unnecessary administrative burdens precisely at the moment
when such organizations have the least amount of time and resources to meet
them. Organizations may also fear that the procedural statute would be too
heavily weighted toward maintaining the status quo, and would restrict their
ability to shift resources and their strategic focus in order to respond to
changing community needs. While both are legitimate concerns, it is important
to reiterate that satisfying the statute's legal requirements would likely require
only minimal time and expense on the part of the nonprofit. First, because the
primary purpose of the statute is simply to ensure open and timely
communication between government and the nonprofit entity, it is difficult to
envision the logistical steps requiring significant effort on the part of the
nonprofit. Governments should, however, be sensitive to the fact that
reorganizing nonprofits will almost certainly have limited resources, and
governments should therefore endeavor to make compliance with the
procedural requirements as simple and straightforward as is possible. Second, it
is worth reiterating that the nonprofit organization would retain complete
autonomy regarding final decisions about resource allocation and strategic
focus under this proposal. As was noted in Section A, the purpose of the
procedural statute is not to achieve substantive ends through procedural means,
but rather to provide government with the information it needs to assist those
who will be the most vulnerable when the nonprofit closes or reorganizes. In
sum, to those critics who might argue that the proposed statute allows the
government to go too far, this Section has sought to illustrate that the
procedural statute proposed in this Note actually places clear limits on just how
far the government may go.
CONCLUSION
Closing parishes is not a recent development; even in the Archdiocese of
Boston, several parishes a year have been closed over the past decade as part of
the normal evolution of the Archdiocese. 145 In every area where there has been
a demographic shift over the years, closure may indeed be a necessary
component of diocesan management, in much the same way that an arborist
removes branches from a tree in order to ensure the continued health of the
whole. However, the extent of the 2004 reorganization in Boston was
unprecedented, and the manner in which the reorganization process was
conducted placed government in a position where it had no way to mitigate the
145. From 1985 to 2003, sixty-one parishes in the Archdiocese were either suppressed or merged.
Archdiocese of Boston, Parish Reconfigurations (1985-2003), http://www.rcab.org/Parish-
Reconfiguration/reconfiguration.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2006).
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adverse collateral effects. While the ad hoc approaches taken by governmental
leaders to redress this situation may have been a product of the speed and
surprise of the reorganization, these actions were ineffective because they took
the wrong approach. In being either too punitive or too conciliatory, these
actions were not designed to mitigate effectively the actual problems of social
service provision that the closures would cause to state and local government.
Unfortunately, the magnitude of the Boston closings is not likely to be an
aberration. As was noted in the Introduction, the Archdioceses of New York,
Chicago, and Newark, New Jersey are all contemplating significant closure
programs, and more archdioceses are almost certain to follow. 14 6 Over the next
decade, as Mass attendance continues to decline, priest shortages continue to
multiply, and church coffers continue to empty, dioceses and governments
across the country will face precisely the same problems that Boston faced
during 2004. Moreover, although repeating Boston's ad hoc approach to these
problems is a recipe for breeding antagonism and mistrust, governments who
do not have an alternative proactive policy in place will likely find themselves
reliving the mistakes of their Massachusetts counterparts.
The procedural statute proposed in this Note would provide a new and
unique way to address both the constitutional and practical concerns that appear
to have impeded the variety of governmental responses that were proposed
through early 2004. By melding the legal and the diplomatic, such a statute
would be more likely than previous approaches to create benefits for all parties
involved-government, the Archdiocese, and local communities and parishes.
Although this statute would not necessarily prevent the closure of parishes--or
of other faith-based social service providers, for that matter-it would provide
government with an additional legal tool that might help mitigate the effects of
the closures on social services. In a situation bound to be fraught with high
emotions and impassioned argument, a statute such as this one would provide a
measure of order and process-two factors that were notably missing from the
scenario that unfolded in Boston.
It is incontrovertible that even if the proposed statute were passed
immediately in Massachusetts, the effect would be prospectively preventative
rather than retrospectively remedial. Yet those who do not learn from history
are condemned to repeat it: the lessons of Boston should not be confined to
Boston alone, or to the context of the Roman Catholic Church. This Note
therefore offers a postmortem of the failures of the Boston reorganization in the
hopes that the solution offered herein provides a clarion call to the hundreds of
other communities nationwide who are increasingly likely to face similar
closings crises in the near future. Indeed, as the percentage of social services
146. See supra note 9.
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being provided through faith-based continues to increase,' 47 the need will
continue to grow for policy mechanisms that help governments ensure that
social service delivery is not adversely affected if such faith-based providers
either cut back on their offerings or close altogether.
America has always held at its core the fundamental value of separation of
church and state. Yet while church and state may be separated by law, they are
frequently united in their common concern for the welfare of the oppressed, the
poor, and the dispossessed. It is imperative for both governmental and religious
leaders to work together in seeking creative and innovative ways to protect both
religious independence and those in society who are most in need. As the
Boston Globe observed, "public officials [are] eager to work together to
minimize the pain of closings. But first, church leaders must show up.
148
Hopefully, strategies like the one outlined above will provide church leaders-
and leaders of other nonprofit social service providers that are facing
consolidation or reorganization-with the incentive to do just that. For as it is
written in the Book of Proverbs, "where there is no vision, the people
perish."'
149
147. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, GRANTS TO
FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 7 (2006), available at www.whitehouse.gov/
govemmentlfbci/final-report_2005.pdf (showing, for example, that the number of grants made by the
Federal Department of Health and Human Services to faith-based organizations increased by 82%
between FY2002 and FY2005, and that the total dollar value of these grants increased by 64% over the
same period).
148. Church-City Teamwork, supra note 68.
149. Proverbs 29:18.
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